Analysts often provide forecasts of one-year ahead earnings, earnings two-year ahead, as well as long-term earnings growth rates. In our attempts to understand the properties of these contemporaneous multi-period earnings forecasts, we begin by examining whether analysts' earnings forecasts can be described using the linear information dynamics (LID). We find that LID is an appropriate description of analysts' information processing for 77% of our firm year observations. For firm-year observations that exhibit LID, we develop a theoretical procedure to infer the persistence of abnormal earnings, analysts' other information about future abnormal earnings (not in current abnormal earnings), and the persistence of other information at individual firm year level. Demonstrating that the two symmetrical combinations of the persistence parameters derived from our estimation procedure lead to the same price estimate, we then calculate the predicted firm value (incorporating analysts' private information). Our results show that the predicted firm value is statistically associated with the observed market value. In addition, when forecasted abnormal earnings are expressed as an ARMA (2,1) process, the median persistence in current forecasted abnormal earnings into one period ahead forecasted abnormal earnings is 0.95 and the median persistence in lagged forecasted abnormal earnings into one period ahead forecasted abnormal earnings is 0.16. Since our procedure allows us to infer analysts' other/private information, we find that the main information incorporated in returns originate mostly from innovations in other information rather than innovations in abnormal earnings. Using analysts' forecasts of one-year ahead earnings, two-year ahead earnings, and longterm earnings growth rates, we develop a procedure which infers analysts' private information for each individual firm-year. We assume that analysts' contemporaneous multi-period forecasts of (abnormal) earnings exhibit properties consistent with the Linear Information Dynamics (LID) in Ohlson (1995) . When an analyst makes three contemporaneous analysts' forecasts for different forecast horizons, investors can infer the analysts' other information as well as the persistence of abnormal earnings and the persistence of other information.
Introduction
For many firms, analysts provide forecasts of one-year ahead earnings, two-year ahead earnings as well as the long-term growth rate for earnings three to five year ahead. In contrast to the substantial body of research on the time series of 'realized' earnings, the extant literature has provided very little insights on the time-series properties of analysts' contemporaneous multi-period earnings forecasts. It is the aims of this study to provide collective evidence on analysts' information processing and their role in the market place via the examination of analysts' contemporaneous multi-period earnings forecasts.
Ohlson (1995) recognizes that investors and market intermediaries rely on information sources other than accounting information when assessing the market value of the firm, and introduces the role of 'other information' to his valuation model. 'Other information' is information about future abnormal earnings that is not in current abnormal earnings.
Following a suggestion in Liu and Ohlson (2000) and Ohlson (2001) , a number of papers employ analysts' one-year ahead forecast to deduce information about future abnormal earnings that is not in current abnormal earnings for a cross-sectional set of firms.
1 Collectively, analysts' may possess value-relevant information in addition to the information reflected in firms' current financial statements. Analysts' acquire their informational advantage through costly activities, such as data collection and data analyses. The use of analysts' earnings forecasts to deduce information about future abnormal earnings that is not in current earnings seems to be a logical starting point. We refer to the information about future abnormal earnings (not in current earnings) embedded in analysts contemporaneous multi-period forecasts as analysts' private information.
Using analysts' forecasts of one-year ahead earnings, two-year ahead earnings, and longterm earnings growth rates, we develop a procedure which infers analysts' private information for each individual firm-year. We assume that analysts' contemporaneous multi-period forecasts of (abnormal) earnings exhibit properties consistent with the Linear Information Dynamics (LID) in Ohlson (1995) . When an analyst makes three contemporaneous analysts' forecasts for different forecast horizons, investors can infer the analysts' other information as well as the persistence of abnormal earnings and the persistence of other information.
Since this inference process can take place independently each year for each individual firm, we can study the cross-sectional and inter-temporal characteristics of analysts' use of other information. This is in contrast with prior papers that only exploit one-year ahead analysts' forecasts to deduce analysts' other information at a pooled regression level. We begin by examining whether analysts' contemporaneous earnings forecasts exhibit properties consistent with LID. For firm-year observations consistent with LID, our inference procedure allows us to examine the followings: (i) the persistence of analysts' current and lagged forecasted abnormal earnings on analysts' forecast of oneperiod forecasted abnormal earnings (ii) the volatility of abnormal earnings innovations relative to the volatility of innovations in other information. In addition, we are able to provide evidence on (iii) the association between observed market prices and estimated prices that incorporate analysts' private information; and (iv) the association between observed market return and the innovations in abnormal earnings and other information.
Collectively, our empirical results contribute to the understanding of analysts' information processing and their role in the market place.
We find that LID is an appropriate description of analysts' information processing for 77% of our firm-year observations. Demonstrating that the two symmetrical combinations of the persistence parameters inferred from our estimation method lead to the same price estimate, we then calculate the predicted firm value (incorporating analysts' private information). Our results show a statistically significant association between predicted firm values and actual observed firm values.
When forecasted abnormal earnings are expressed as an ARMA(2,1) process, the median persistence in current forecasted abnormal earnings into one-period ahead forecasted abnormal earnings is 0.95 and the median persistence in lagged forecasted abnormal earnings into one-period ahead forecasted future abnormal earnings is 0.16. The inferred persistence of current forecasted abnormal earnings is close to unity suggests that, on average, analysts' forecast future abnormal earnings by assuming constant current abnormal earnings.
We find that the volatility of the implied innovations in other information is approximately 5 times larger than the volatility of the implied abnormal earnings innovations, suggesting that revisions in analysts' forecasts are based largely on information currently not impounded in current abnormal earnings. Lastly, we show that the association between return and the innovations in other information is statistically significant; whereas, the association between return and the innovations in abnormal earnings is not significant.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the prior literature. Section 3 describes the accounting-based valuation model and outlines our inference procedure.
We also characterize some important properties of the inferred persistence parameters and the resulting predicted prices. Section 4 presents the data and Section 5 reports our empirical findings. Finally, we summarize and outline future possible research in section 6. All proofs are in the appendix.
Literature Review and Discussion
Our paper builds on the prior accounting-based valuation literature. estimates with other information deduced from analysts' one-year ahead earnings.
Further, Myers (1999) follows Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and allows for conservative accounting resulting in a negative bias in the predicted prices of 35.6%. LID facilitates closed-form valuation expressions based on currently observable information and allows us to simultaneously infer the other information as well as the persistence of abnormal earnings and the persistence of other information. Choi, O'Hanlon and Pope (2004) attribute the 35.6% bias reported in Myers (1999) to his projection of future abnormal earnings with on average negative realizations. Choi, O'Hanlon and Pope (2004) extend Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999) by allowing for conservative accounting and utilize scaled residual income in their LID-based projections. They report a lower negative bias of 23.1%. Next, we review the prior literature in detail.
In an early empirical paper, Frankel and Lee (1998) use return-on-equity (ROE) to estimate future abnormal earnings. They model future ROE as a piecewise function. In the short run, ROE is estimated to be constant and abnormal earnings are assumed constant in the calculation of continuing value. As Myers (1999) points out, this piecewise function is time-inconsistent since it violates the law of iterated expectations.
That is when a period that currently lies in the long run eventually cross into the short run, the information dynamics would change predictably. However, the piecewise function does not allow for this anticipated change. Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999) , henceforth DHS, study the implications of LID. First, they assume that the persistence of abnormal earnings and the persistence of other information (below denoted by ω and γ , respectively) are common for all firms and estimate them from a two-stage yearly pooled time-series regression. Based on these estimates, DHS calculate the predicted firm values and test empirically whether ω differs reliably from 0 and 1 (although they do relax the constraints on the boundary of ω ), whether first-order autoregressive (AR) process describes abnormal earnings by adding additional lags, and whether γ differs from 0 and 1. Finally, DHS estimates ω with conditioning variables.
In contrast to DHS, Myers (1999) uses time-series analyses to estimate LID for each firm.
He allows for conservatism based on Feltham and Ohlson (1995) ε , have a mean of zero and are independent from each other and over time. Under the above assumptions and the clean surplus assumption, Ohlson (1995) expresses firm value as:
with coefficients:
Note that these coefficients depend on the discount rate (r), the persistence of abnormal earnings (ω ), and the persistence of analysts' other information (γ ). Ohlson (1995) requires that We presume that analysts' use all their information available to make rational forecasts for any forecast horizon, j, that is,
Equation (4) implies that analysts make unbiased forecasts given their information.
Given that we do not correct for analysts' bias, we draw the following caveats. analysts' forecasts will be naïve since we do not consider analysts' bias.
Given LID assumption, we show in the appendix that the analysts' forecasts of earnings one-two-, and three-years ahead can be written as Here, other information is not directly observable to investors. Nonetheless, we argue that investors can infer from the above three analysts' forecasts the information that is not directly observable. To further illustrate, investors can calculate the most recent abnormal earnings from the earnings and book values which are publicly disclosed and hence observable. Arguably, if investors knew, which they do not, the analysts' other appear to vary with the relationship between the firm and the investment bank that employs the analyst following the firm. information at time t, t v , investors would infer from the one-year ahead forecast the persistence of abnormal earnings to be:
Armed with the inferred persistence of abnormal earnings, investors could next infer the persistence of analysts' information from the one-year and two-year ahead analysts' forecasts:
It should now be clear that the three-year ahead analyst forecast allows investors to infer analysts' other information. Combining all three analyst forecasts, investors may therefore infer all three components of analysts' information that are relevant under LID assumption: other information, the persistence of other information, and the persistence of abnormal earnings.
However, as we demonstrate formally in the appendix, it is possible that some analysts' forecasts are inconsistent with the LID assumption. This occurs when a firm-year specific constant, D , defined in the appendix becomes negative. Further, the analysts' forecasts may be consistent with two different inferences made by investors. When
, two inferences are feasible, we denote the inferred values by superscripts "+" and "-", respectively. While such non-unique inferences are generally difficult to interpret, we prove results below that facilitate our empirical analyses.
There are two solutions when 0 > D . Analog to Ohlson (2001) , when graphically plotting pairs of inferred persistence parameters, the pairs of inferred persistence parameters exhibit symmetry in the sense that they are mirror images around the 45 degree upward sloping line in a graph. Proposition 1 below formalizes this statement.
Proposition 1:
This symmetry property is helpful because it means that we can attribute arbitrarily, without loss of generality, the higher persistence to either abnormal earnings or other information. Rewriting of the lag polynomial that describes the time-series properties of abnormal earnings, we see that:
, as is standard, that is, a t x 1 +~A RMA(2,1).
7 Note that the sum and the product of the persistence parameters play important roles in describing the expectations towards the future because they show up in as the AR-coefficients. Fortunately, the sum and the product are the same for each pair of inferred persistence parameters, yet they are not the whole story as seen by γ in the MA-term.
We next show the following critical result regarding neutrality of accounting-based valuation. The inferred market prices are unique even when investors' cannot make unique inferences about the three components of analysts' information. Proposition 2 states this formally:
7 See Hamilton (1994).
Proposition 2:
This result is important because it allows us to follow Easton (1984) and Myers (1999) and empirically compare predicted, inferred prices to observed actual prices.
Since the inferred other information differs while the inferred market prices coincide, it would not be surprising if the valuation coefficient on other information were to differ between the two inferred solutions. However, lemma 1 establishes that this is not the case. Instead, the valuation coefficients on abnormal earnings may differ:
We can therefore also interpret the effect of other information on firm values without reference to a particular inferred solution.
Finally, we compare the inferred innovations, or noise terms, for abnormal earnings and other information:
Lemma 2:
This result allows us to calculate and compare the standard deviation of the innovations even though the inferences are not unique. Consequently, we can attribute the source of new information to either financial information (abnormal earnings) or other information.
Data
We use analysts' consensus forecasts of earnings per share collected from I/B/E/S adjusted files for the period between 1985 and 2003. These forecasts are taken from the first month after the I/B/E/S reported period t earnings announcement. Stock return data are from the CRSP daily files. We collect historical accounting data from COMPUSTAT files, including book value of equity and dividends to common shareholders. All empirical analyses are performed using per share data. Following DHS, we use a discount rate of 12%, which approximates the long-run average realized return on US equities. Our results are insensitive to choice of discount rates ranging from 9 to 15%.
Our sample was reduced as follows. When matching COMPUSTAT with IBES with at least one forecast (usually one-year ahead), we end up with 53,898 firm-year observations. After imposing the requirement that firms must have analysts forecasting earnings for each of the next two years as well as long-term growth rates, results in 24,863 observations. Observations with negative book value of equity are excluded. We exclude firms in the utilities (SIC 4900-4999) and financial institutions (SIC 6000-6411).
We further delete and the top and bottom 1% of observations by years to variables of interest to mitigate the effect of extreme values (book values, current earnings, one-year ahead earnings forecasts, two-year ahead earnings forecasts, and long term earnings growth forecasts). As is standard, we need to convert analysts' forecast of earnings to analysts' forecasts of abnormal earnings, so we construct future book value assuming a constant dividend. 8 The final sample consists of 17,995 observations.
Empirical Analyses
This section summarizes our empirical findings. Table 1 41.07% of the observations generate parameters that lead to finite predicted firm value (Panel D). These firms have larger market capitalization and more analysts' followings than firm year observations consistent with LID but smaller in market capitalization and fewer analysts' followings than firms that require Ohlson's (1995) restriction. Table 2 reports summary statistics regarding our inferred parameters using our estimation procedure. 10 In Table 3 , we report our median estimates by year to illustrate that the distribution of our inferred LID-parameters are reasonably stable over time. Even though the two persistence parameters are non-unique (we have two possible solutions) in our estimation procedure, the symmetry property of the two pairs of persistence parameters ensures that the sum and the product for each pair of the inferred persistence parameters remain the same. 11 In interpreting our implied estimates of ) ( Table 2 , Panel A) and range from 0.72 to 1.08 across our sample years (in Table 3 ). The median implied value for the product ωγ reported in Table 2 Others.
In addition, . Since the accounting-based valuation is linear and does not take into account investors' limited liability option, some hypothetical net returns are below -100% (As evidenced by the minimum net return being -322.06%).
The median (mean) net return is 12% (29%). We also report summary statistics of the difference between these two returns, turn Diff Re . The median and mean differences 12 The choice of estimated price as the dependent variable is to avoid errors in variable problem that may bias the slope coefficient towards zero. between the two returns are 0.02 and 0.13 respectively. Table 6 reports the corresponding median estimates for each year and across industry classifications.
In Table 6 , we also report the estimates of innovations (or error terms) attributable to abnormal earnings and other information for each firm-year. Here, estimates of innovations are calculated by comparing the actual abnormal earnings and actual other information at time t with the product of implied persistence parameters at period t-1 with abnormal earnings and other information at time t-1 (i.e., 
Conclusion
In this paper, we implemented the analysis at the firm level using consensus analysts'
forecast, yet the methodology introduced in this paper could also be applied to individual
analysts' who provide at least three years of analyst forecasts. This application would allow researchers to address different research questions in future research. For example, do different analysts' hold the same private information in providing forecasts? If so, do they apply the same implied persistence of abnormal earnings and other information?
With analyst-specific other information, one could revisit the effect of analysts' characteristics, see work by Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2003) .
Our methodology opens new avenues for future research because it results in firm-year specific inferences about the analysts' perceptions of the persistence in abnormal earnings. First, we can examine the mean reverting process of abnormal earnings and show whether the rate of mean reversion is systematically associated with quality of earnings, dividend payout ratio, or correlated across firms within the same industry. In particular, one might conjecture that firms with extreme levels of earnings and extreme accounting rates of return revert more quickly (Brooks and Buckmaster, 1976; Freeman et al., 1982) . Also, non-recurring special items (including restructuring charges and asset write-downs) are less likely to persist (Fairfield et al, 1996) although IBES earnings numbers should have removed special items. Firms with extreme levels of operating accruals, accounting rates of return are less likely to persist (Sloan, 1996) . Dividend policy may be an indicator of expected future growth in book value of equity. High growth firms tend to have lower payouts (Fazzari et al, 1988; Anthony and Ramesh, 1992) . Firms with low payout will have growth in book value in the future and therefore higher abnormal earnings persistence (see Fazzari et al, 1988; and Anthony and Ramesh, 1992) . Finally, industry-specific factors should influence the persistence of abnormal earnings-and be stable over time.
Valuation models that capitalize analysts' earnings forecasts in perpetuity are better at explaining contemporaneous stock prices. This may be due to investors over-weighing information in analysts' earnings forecasts and under-weighing information in current earnings and book value.
In addition, future work might also measure the association between analysts' bias (which we did not address in this paper) and other information. Conservative accounting is likely going to affect the inferred characteristics of linear information dynamics. We plan to perform additional analyses and tests using the Penman and Zhang q-score.
Finally, if managers provide management forecasts for three year out, a similar analysis could be performed of management's own information. 
Proof of inference of other information:
By substitution of (6) and (7) Finally when D>0 there are two solutions which we can now solve: 
Proof of Proposition 1:
To prove that − + = γ ω , we substitute in from equations (6) and (7) The result now follows from substitution of equation (6) followings. F_Stdev is the standard deviation in analysts' consensus forecasts. MktCap is the market capitalization measured as the product of price per share and the number of shares outstanding. Table 3 for industry classifications. * calculated based on median yearly estimates 
